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This article deals with risk controversies in emerging policy networks regarding
school safety in the Netherlands. It offers a grounded account of the interpreta-
tions of school risks and safety measures by the various stakeholders of the pol-
icy network, in particular, schools, local government and the police.
Theoretically, policy networks are conceived as mediating between the structural
conditions of the ‘risk-society’ and the ‘culture of fear’ on the one hand and the
institution of safety standards on the organizational level of schools on the other
hand. It is argued that in the low-risk context of schools, it is particularly impor-
tant to take into account the soft, cultural side of safety next to the hard, mate-
rial side of safety. This distinction also accounts for the ambiguities and
controversies over school risks. A further conclusion is that in this network a
lack of local leadership seems to hinder the development of ﬁrm safety mea-
sures. Overall, this article highlights the paradox between a concern for safety
and a concern for a school’s reputation.
Keywords: safety culture; schools; risk governance; policy networks; case study
1. Introduction
On 4 April 2008, the Dutch labour party, de PvdA, organized a conference on the
topic of school safety.1 At this conference city councilors of de PvdA reported about
their investigations conducted in several Amsterdam schools and argued that there
should be more openness and awareness concerning school safety problems. The
politicians motivated their concern with reference to a number of severe incidents
and to talk about serious underreport by schools of safety incidents. At that time,
one of the major incidents with national media attention concerned the deadly stab-
bing of a 16–year-old pupil by a 15-year-old classmate in October 2007 at an
Amsterdam technical high school. The family’s attorney argued that the stabber’s
act should be regarded as an act of excessive self-defense because he had over a
long time been bullied at school.2
Many stakeholders participated in the conference, including teachers, students,
school managers, politicians, police ofﬁcers, semi- and non-governmental organiza-
tions, scientists, and journalists. These actors all emphasized different aspects of the
problem. The conference brought together the web of actors related to the school
safety problem as it had emerged in the Netherlands in the ﬁrst decade of the
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twenty-ﬁrst century. In this sense, the conference could be regarded as an organiza-
tional manifestation of a network that usually cannot easily be identiﬁed or discov-
ered since a network is dispersed and fragmented by deﬁnition (Castells 1996;
Provan and Kenis 2008). At a conference, the network temporarily gathers. Organi-
zationally, a conference can therefore be regarded as a ‘ﬁeld conﬁguring event,’
where people from diverse social organizations come together with the intent to
construct an organizational ﬁeld and to develop ideas about the way work in the
ﬁeld should be done (Lampel and Meyer 2008). Following the conference, we
decided to research the network and reconstruct the risk conceptions and the ways
the various stakeholders seek to manage school safety.
School safety refers to a remarkable new risk which contrasts sharply with the
traditional image of a ‘safe haven’ for schools in the Netherlands. However, in the
course of the 1990s, this image became under attack because of an increase in
the number and severity of incidents and (inter)national media hypes regarding
shootings, abuse, harassment, drugs, weapons, discrimination, and bullying at
schools. In the Netherlands, these incidents and concerns triggered the emergence
of school safety policy networks. But how can an organizational ﬁeld, which until
two decades ago was generally regarded as safe and unproblematic, rapidly develop
a serious safety problem? This is the social riddle we would like to address.
Although we deal with the Dutch situation, this issue is not unique for the Nether-
lands. Since the mid-1990s educational institutions in, for instance, the UK also
‘responded to perceived threats to students, staff and learning communities with a
range of security measures, including the introduction of closed-circuit television
(CCTV)’ (Hope 2009, 891).
The new concern for school safety might, in line with Beck’s (1992) and
Giddens’s (1990) theories of the risk society, be seen as both a response to and a
reﬂection on new risks which have emerged as unintended consequences of mod-
ernization processes. In Beck and Giddens’s view, this development has resulted in
a condition of ‘reﬂexive modernization,’ a condition which is characterized by a
heightened awareness and preoccupation with the risks and dangers of modern soci-
eties (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). Regarding safety and security, we also draw
on the work of Furedi (2002), Boutellier (2008), and Boutellier and van Steden
(2011), who address fear and a concern for safety as new organizing principles,
which might be understood in terms of a counterpart or response to an increasingly
uncertain and risky social environment. In line with these bodies of theories, we
assume that the new concern for school safety can be understood as an expression
of a more generalized concern with risk and a culture of fear.
The shift in perception from schools as ‘safe havens’ to places that are under con-
stant threat and need protection from the wider society, also make schools a kind of
anti-case or contrast case for so called ‘high-reliability-organisations’ (HRO) (Atak
and Kingma 2011; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). While HROs are often conceived as
risk-producing organizations, schools should rather be conceived as ‘low-reliability-
organisations’ (LRO), as comparatively open organizations with a low risk awareness
and low safety standards. While risk and safety ﬁgure as prominent features of
HROs, in the context of LROs such as schools a serious concern for risk and safety
issues seems to be virtually absent. And while the social construction of safety in
HROs ﬁgures around the possible neglect and maintenance of high safety standards,
LROs are more concerned with the inverse processes regarding the identiﬁcation of
risks and the introduction and justiﬁcation of safety measures.
914 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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In fact, the organizational level of policy networks might be regarded as mediat-
ing between the structural conditions of the risk society and a culture of fear on the
one hand and the institution of safety standards on the actual level of schools on
the other hand. By focusing on policy networks, we seek to contribute to an under-
standing of how general risks and fears are translated into safety standards at the
organizational level. At the same instant, we might learn how schools contribute to
the understandings of risk and safety in the wider society. Leading questions in this
paper will therefore be: How can we understand the emergence of new school risk
and school safety policies? How are school safety stakeholders deﬁning and dealing
with school risks and safety culture? How do they perceive safety measures such as
cameras and detection systems? Can school safety actually be assessed and man-
aged within the policy network? With reference to the way stakeholders are dealing
with school risks it is also relevant to look at risks which are ‘secondary’ to safety
such as ‘reputational risk’ (Power 2007; Power et al. 2009). School managers know
that the way risks and safety are perceived by the public is very important. For such
reasons, instead of simply managing primary risks, the risk of damaging the organi-
zation’s reputation can become even more important. In this article we will, ulti-
mately, highlight the tension between a concern for safety and a concern for
reputation as a major contradictory force in shaping the emerging policy network
regarding school safety in the Netherlands.
In this article, we ﬁrst discuss the problematization of risk and school safety in
relation to policy networks. Subsequently, the case study and the various stakehold-
ers of the school safety network will be introduced. After that we analyze the risk
controversies and safety policies put forward by the various stakeholders. Finally,
we discuss the school risks and the paradox between safety and reputation.
2. School safety
School safety policy in this article will be conceived in terms of risk governance
and of networks in which the ‘horizontal relationships’ between the various
constitutive organizations of the policy network are stressed.
In line with Beck’s (1992) and Giddens’s (1990) theories of the risk society new
risks are typically associated with technologically advanced, afﬂuent, and individu-
alized societies. Also the business world has adopted a new focus on security, resil-
ience, and assurance which makes concepts of risk important for policy-making and
organizational governance generally (Kingma 2008; Power 2007). Comparably,
Furedi (2002) and in the Netherlands Boutellier (2008) and Boutellier and van
Steden (2011), address and understand a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi) and a ‘safety uto-
pia’ (Boutellier) as a primary policy objective, as new organizing principles which
might be understood in terms of a counterpart or response to an increasingly uncer-
tain and risky social environment. However, as pointed out by Waiton (2008, 130–
4), there are signiﬁcant differences between the risk society discourse in line with
Beck and the fear discourse in line with Furedi. These schools of thought offer dis-
tinct interpretations and explanations of the backgrounds and consequences of the
contemporary risk and safety paradigm. This also bears on the understanding of risk
in the context of schools. It would be a mistake to simply assume that these theoret-
ical frameworks are complementary, i.e. the safety and fear framework is basically
concerned with the consequences of the risk society. In fact, the fear and safety
framework focuses both on different kinds of risk and different backgrounds to the
Journal of Risk Research 915
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widespread concern with risk. Waiton (2008, 132) expresses the difference as fol-
lows:
Rather than risks emerging in relation to global threats, Furedi identiﬁes how the
emergence of a ‘risk consciousness’ has occurred at every level of society and has
impacted upon all relationships and institutions. That children are identiﬁed as being
almost permanently ‘at risk’, for example, cannot be explained by global develop-
ments, or simply in relation to the individualization of everyday life. Rather it is the
end (or perhaps the suspension) of ideologies that held back the individuation of soci-
ety for a century, which have collapsed and are central to understanding the culture of
fear.
This difference makes a safety and fear perspective as developed by Furedi of
immediate relevance to the school safety topic under consideration. In Waiton’s
account of Furedi, safety has become an ‘organizing framework for institutions and
for government,’ and ‘“child safety” is perhaps the best example of this develop-
ment, with safety issues overhanging how children’s activities are understood and
indeed how we understand children themselves’ (Waiton 2008, 8). Furedi’s work
especially deals with fears and victims of crime and anti-social behavior that could
be related to the erosion of traditional moral standards which makes ‘almost any
form of behavior and outlook acceptable … – as long as it is safe and does not dis-
turb the safety of others’ (Waiton 2008, 134). In this sense Furedi (2002) sees risk-
taking as a consequence of a ‘morality of low expectations.’ This morality might
even be reinforced by surveillance technologies such as CCTV, because if students
are ‘expected to misbehave, then deviancy may become perceived as a mundane,
inevitable, everyday occurrence’ (Hope 2009, 903).
Since risk is always deﬁned by the difference between the actual and the possi-
ble, Furedi (2002, 24) relates the perception of risk and fear about the future to the
anxieties for problems we face today. When we fear the future, one tends to assess
the probability of adverse outcomes much higher (Furedi 2002, 26). Furedi argues
that we have entered a stage in which we stress the ‘intrinsic riskiness of virtually
every type of human activity’ and carry out risk assessments in the home, in school,
in the workplace, and in leisure environments. The combined effect is to ‘elevate
safety into a cardinal virtue of contemporary society’ (Ibid., 26). In Furedi’s view,
the present era is characterized by an ‘inﬂation of danger,’ a heightened sensitivity
for dangers, the recognition of a range of new dangers and the enlargement of the
possible bad consequences of natural, social, and technological risks. Because of
this, for instance crime responses ‘often take on panic-like proportions’ (Ibid., 32).
Furedi prioritizes the subjective over the objective dimension of risk and therefore
regards the process of ‘problematization’ as key for the understanding of risks
(Furedi 2002, 66). He illustrates this with the example of ‘bullying’ and ‘sexual
harassment’ which both have a long history, but have only recently been deﬁned as
social problems. In a similar way, we will regard school safety as a new social
problem. Although Furedi (2002) regards the problematization of risks as crucial,
his work does not elaborate on how this ‘problematization’ works or should be con-
ceptualized.
In line with Furedi’s approach we will, on the organizational level of schools,
not conceive of ‘safety culture’ as an objectively given condition, but rather as a
socially constructed and relative organizational property dependent upon
organizational values, meanings and safety practices (Atak and Kingma 2011;
916 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella 1998, 143; Richter and Koch 2004). Schools may
claim to be ‘safe,’ but what this means in practice will for instance depend upon
the risk perceptions, the precautionary measures, the kind of school, and the region
or neighborhood where it is situated. Safety culture and safety policies should be
conceptualized as a particular way of dealing with risks, or in other words with
‘risk-governance’ (Renn 2008).
In a risk governance approach, risks or the possible consequences of organiza-
tional decisions and actions, are converted into organizing principles and focal
points in management processes (Hutter and Power 2005). In processes of risk gov-
ernance, risk ‘represents a speciﬁc way in which aspects of reality can be conceptu-
alized and rendered controllable’ (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006, 45). Regarding
organizational safety, Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella (1998) indicate for instance
that ambiguity is situated at the center of the social construction of safety since con-
sensus and dissension are issue-speciﬁc and constantly ﬂuctuating entities. They
conceive of safety as ‘an emergent property of a socio-technical system, as the end
product of a process of social construction involving people, technologies and texts
assembled into systems of material relations’ (Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella 1998,
203). Our empirical research therefore traces historically and qualitatively the emer-
gence of a particular school safety policy network. In the process of internalizing
threats, the actors of this network all in one way or another have to deal with the
three basic questions, identiﬁed by Renn (2008, 40), regarding the ‘(un)desirability’
of events, the ‘uncertainty’ of events and the ‘conceptualization’ of risks and safety.
These three basic questions all depend upon cultural preferences and social context
(Ibid.). Risk governance thus goes beyond straightforward risk assessments and risk
regulations. According to Renn (2008, 9), ‘risk governance looks at the complex
web of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how
relevant risk information is collected, analyzed and communicated, and how man-
agement decisions are taken.’ In this respect, this article offers an inventory of the
risk conceptions about school safety as expressed by the various stakeholders. Fol-
lowing the risk governance approach, we are particularly concerned with the consti-
tutive role of networks for the contemporary organization of school safety. Schools
are embedded in networks of organizations in which school safety is problematized
and safety measures are discussed and developed. School safety is organized in the
horizontal ‘nodal order’ (Boutellier and van Steden 2011) of a network rather than
in the hierarchical order of the government or the police. Because we are not only
interested in the involvement of the network but also would like to learn about the
composition and the effectiveness of the network, we more speciﬁcally refer to the
work of Provan and Kenis (2008), who seek to relate various types of organiza-
tional networks to network outcomes. They distinguish between the logics and
dynamics of ‘participant-governed networks,’ ‘lead-organization networks,’ and
‘network administrative organizations’ (NAOs). We will argue that the school safety
network combines several features of these network types, and that the network also
changes in character and effectiveness over time. This conception of networks will
be further operationalized in the methods section.
An Actor–Network Theory (ANT) perspective (Callon 1986; Latour 2005) could
further be particularly helpful in analyzing how schools ‘problematize’ safety, how
new, safety management related, actors are ‘interested’ in and ‘enrolled’ in the insti-
tutional ﬁeld of schools, and how research has been ‘mobilized’ to account for
school safety and risk management strategies. The instances of ‘problematization,’
Journal of Risk Research 917
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‘enrollment,’ and ‘mobilization’ can be regarded as successive moments in the
‘translation’ of actor–networks (Callon, 1986). ANT may be helpful in analyzing
the problematization of risks and at the same time account for the composition of
the organizational safety network. The problematization of risks starts with how cer-
tain ‘risk objects’ are deﬁned and translated by various actors in the network. In
order to manage and counter risks, risks needs to be deﬁned accurately to prevent
institutions from creating uncertainty themselves. Organizations therefore formulate
their uncertainties into objects. The process of uncertainties becoming risk objects
requires an analysis of the way these are ‘represented and constructed within orga-
nizational and managerial ﬁelds’ (Power 2007, 8). According to Power risk objects
are:
essentially ideas about harm with implicit causality and may become the focus of
‘socio-technical networks’ understood as ‘seamless webs’ of elements and actors
engaged in strategies for institutionalizing or de-institutionalizing particular objects of
knowledge. (Power 2007, 25)
Regarding the risk objects and processes of risk translation, it is highly relevant to
also look at risks which are ‘secondary’ to safety such as ‘reputational risk’ (Power
et al. 2009). As mentioned in the introduction, we clearly noticed that school man-
agers were very concerned with the way risk and safety is perceived by the public.
A signiﬁcant feature of school risk relates to the public image of schools and to
their legitimacy. Contesting the perception of the public and policy-makers, or the
‘managing of reputational risk’ (Power 2007), is one of the strategies of school
managers to legitimize school safety management. According to Power, the scope
of risk management has deﬁnitely been broadened. Not only do organizations
attempt to increase safety, but they also increasingly direct their attention towards
reputation. Thus, schools and their stakeholders are highly concerned with the pub-
lic perceptions on the risks they face. So, how do schools maintain a positive and
safe image?
3. The case study
In the theoretical section, we outlined why we need to ﬁnd out, in order to under-
stand the problematical nature of school safety, how various stakeholders of the
school safety network perceive risks and translate them into policies, actions, and
other consequences. We analyze the network of organizations involved in the pol-
icy-making and construction of risks in relation to school safety. Differences in
opinions and actions regarding school safety will be related to organizational cul-
ture, strategies, objectives, and interests of the stakeholders. The overall research
strategy was qualitative. By adopting qualitative methods, we seek to ‘interpret or
make sense of certain phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994). The approach is also holistic in order to preserve the
complexities of human behavior.
The empirical research consisted in total of 16 in-depth and transcribed inter-
views with representatives of the involved organizations. Most of these interviews
were conducted in spring 2009. In addition, all relevant documents were studied,
including policy reports of the national and local government, the Amsterdam
police department and the VIOS (Safety In and Around Schools) project
organization. We further analyzed the media coverage of school safety issues and
918 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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observed the actual school settings and safety measures mentioned in this article.
The sample of organizations included ﬁve secondary schools where we interviewed
four ‘safety coordinators’ and one assistant manager. Of the ‘Association of Respre-
sentatives of Amsterdam Schoolboards’ (OSVO), we conducted one interview with
a board member and one interview with the project manager of the VIOS project.
In addition, we also conducted an interview with the management of an applied
research institute, DSP, involved in several school safety researches (DSP-groep
2008, 2009, 2010). Regarding the Amsterdam police department, we conducted
interviews with four area ofﬁcers, one district coordinator, and a school project
manager. At the local Amsterdam government, we had one interview with an ofﬁ-
cial of the social development department (DMO) and one interview with a district
chairman (disctrict ‘Geuzenveld-Slotermeer’).
The research focused on secondary schools in Amsterdam. In Amsterdam there
are over 70 secondary schools scattered throughout the city covering all educational
levels, school sizes, backgrounds, and population types. We visited ﬁve randomly
selected secondary schools but made sure that they roughly covered a range of edu-
cational levels, size, and district locations. The educational level of two schools
should be classiﬁed as high (HAVO-VWO), two were medium-leveled schools,
(VMBO) and one was a low-level school offering education speciﬁcally adapted to
pupils with some kind of deﬁcit. Three of these schools were medium sized,
facilitating between 600 and 1000 pupils. Two schools were relatively small, facili-
tating between 90 and 200 pupils. One school was located in Amsterdam East
(Watergraafsmeer), three schools in Amsterdam West (Bos & Lommer, Osdorp and
Slotermeer), and one school was located in Amsterdam Old-West. This sample can
theoretically be regarded as fairly representative of the range of secondary schools
in Amsterdam.
The research was based upon the principles of ‘grounded theory’ (Bernard
2002, 463 ff; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Suddaby 2006). These principles include the
methods of ‘constant comparison’ and ‘theoretical sampling,’ which implies that the
research evolves in an interactive process in which the researcher selects informants
and develops conceptual categories and ﬁlls them with data until a certain level of
saturation of the categories is reached, i.e. until the insights become increasingly
repetitive. In this way, data collection and analysis are a simultaneous process.
While conducting interviews, new themes and new directions and opportunities for
the research emerged. With a general theoretical framework in mind, we sought to
ﬁnd out to which extent and how the theoretical themes were reﬂected in the inter-
views, documents, and school safety practice. This way, we combined inductive
and deductive coding:
Starting with some general themes derived from reading the literature and adding more
themes and subthemes as you go. (…) You have a general idea of what you’re after
and you know at least what some of the big themes are, but you are still in a discov-
ery mode, so you let new themes emerge from the texts as you go along. (Bernard
2002, 464–5)
Grounded theory is ﬁrst and foremost directed at making statements about how
actors interpret and construct reality and is not intended for testing hypotheses and
theories. We are fully aware that grounded theory does not imply that one can do
without literature and substantive theory (Suddaby 2006). Our research is clearly
guided by the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section. In this sense,
Journal of Risk Research 919
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our objective is not so much to develop completely ‘new’ theory but rather to elab-
orate, reﬁne and substantiate risk governance theorizing with our understanding of
the Dutch school safety policy network.
Before discussing the risk and safety conceptions of the school safety stakehold-
ers, we will ﬁrst analyze the network and overall school safety policy. Since schools
are the primary subject of this policy, schools should perhaps be regarded as the
most important stakeholder. The leading focus of our research consistently was on
how schools are, or should in the views of the stakeholders be, dealing with safety.
Overall, the research clearly indicated signiﬁcant differences in the way school risks
and safety issues were perceived between schools as well as between the various
actors of the school safety policy network.
In operational terms, Provan and Kenis (2008, 231) deﬁne a network as ‘a
group of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to
achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal.’ A focus on governance
involves in their view ‘the use of institutions and structures of authority and collab-
oration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the
network as a whole’ (Ibid.). This includes the linking or sharing of information,
goods, and competences between the constitutive organizations of the network.
How organizations within a network cooperate should be considered ‘the result of a
partnership of different organizations involved; its quality is derived from teamwork
between organizations – not from what each organization has to offer individually.’
Besides, in this type of network ‘every stakeholder is equally concerned with the
faith and success of other organizations – not just their own’ (Ibid.).
At the 2008 Amsterdam conference mentioned in the introduction to this article,
there was indeed a widely shared feeling that cooperation between the various
stakeholders is crucial for developing a successful school safety policy. All partici-
pants agreed that schools need to take common action and have to closely work
together with the police and local government. The question remains, however, how
effective and efﬁcient cooperation could in this case actually be. Provan and Kenis
(2008) stress that cooperation between organizations does not automatically make a
network effective. While the idea of a network often is not much more than a group
of actors (persons or organizations) that communicate intensively and that this com-
munication itself makes the network effective, Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that
the network needs some kind of design and control in order to be effective. In view
of the effectiveness and efﬁciency of networks, Provan and Kenis (2008) distin-
guish three modes of network governance: The ‘participant-governed network,’ the
‘leader-organization network,’ and the NAO. Since we will seek to analyze and
understand the Amsterdam school safety network in terms of these ideal types of
network governance we will discuss these ideal types a little further.
A ‘participant-governed network’ entails different organizations that cooperate
collectively, without a separate control unit. This is the most horizontally structured
network type. Control of communal activities depends on the participants them-
selves. The participant-governed network has many highly involved participants,
but it is relatively inefﬁcient since all stakeholders communicate with each other,
which makes it hard to ﬁnd consensus among them. A ‘leader-organization net-
work’ has vertical relationships in addition to the horizontal lines of communica-
tion. In this type of network, stakeholders share one common goal, and cooperate
and interact with each other but all activities and major decisions are coordinated
by the leading stakeholder. The leading stakeholder needs to be competent and
920 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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legitimate. A disadvantage of this network type is that the leading stakeholder might
have a secret agenda and dominate other stakeholders. In the third mode of the
NAO, stakeholders themselves create a separate entity with the task to manage and
coordinate the network activities. The main difference with the leader organization
network is that the managing entity does not coincide with one of the constitutive
organizations. Its specialized task is to coordinate the network.
The most efﬁcient and effective mode of network governance cannot be unam-
biguously deﬁned beforehand. According to Provan and Kenis (2008, 237) four fac-
tors may explain the preference for one form of network governance over another:
(1) trust among stakeholders; (2) size of the network; (3) goal consensus; and (4)
need for network level competence. In a self-regulating network, trust is for
instance essential but in case a network involves a large number of stakeholders the
NAO model might be more efﬁcient. In case of a leading organization network and
a NAO, consensus does not need to be as high as in a self-regulating network. It is
also important to deﬁne what the goals of a network are and what is externally
expected from a network. For instance, in case a network needs to improve coordi-
nation, a leading organization or administrative organization is preferable. When
external expectations are high, for instance in the case of subsidizing or sponsoring
organizations the relevance of a leading actor or stakeholder increases as well.
4. Deconstructing the network
In this section, we analyze the Amsterdam school safety network from three organi-
zational angles. First, we zoom in on schools as the primary subject of safety pol-
icy. Second, we analyze the network position of the local government to address
the policy dimension. And third, we focus on the local police as the primary institu-
tional safety specialist. We end this section with a discussion of how the dynamics
between these stakeholders constitute the network.
4.1. Schools and safety coordinators
Most schools have a school board which has an important coordinating role in and
between schools. In order to make policy, consensus is needed between school
management and its board. The school boards are in their turn part of an association
of school boards such as OSVO, the biggest school board association in
Amsterdam. With regard to school safety OSVO initiated in 2001 the project
‘Safety In and Around Schools’ (VIOS) (Francissen and Hermans 2004). VIOS
aimed at developing and enhancing collective and integral safety standards for
schools in Amsterdam. The VIOS-project also directly supports and advises second-
ary schools in Amsterdam about safety management and safety measures. For
schools, VIOS thus constitutes an important stakeholder regarding safety policy.
In 2005, VIOS was granted subsidies by the local government of Amsterdam. A
precondition for schools to claim this subsidy was that schools had to appoint a so
called ‘safety coordinator’ and that they should make a school safety plan. The
safety coordinator is usually a staff member or a teacher who for a part of his or
her time is assigned the task of dealing with safety issues in and around school. In
practice, the VIOS network functions as a platform for the safety coordinators, to
discuss, inspire, and learn from each other. Also school directors regularly get
together to discuss safety policy issues, for instance regarding subsidies. Further,
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school boards, police, city districts, and public transport representatives take part in
the network in order to discuss and maintain a safe school environment.
The school safety coordinators are concerned with school safety on a practical
level, dealing with the daily safety practices of a school. From the interviews, we
learned that a safety coordinator’s main concern is to guarantee a ‘safe school cli-
mate.’ This means, that they are not only involved in technical safety measures at
schools, such as guarding the building or ﬁre prevention, but that they are also con-
cerned with the social dimension of safety. This dimension was typically addressed
with statements such as ‘a school is a place where people should feel like at home.’
Schools seek to stimulate a cultural climate which prevents incidents such as ﬁght-
ing, bullying, stealing, discrimination, or sexual intimidation. However, within the
everyday practice of schools there are considerable differences and controversies
over what constitutes an incident. One safety coordinator told about this contro-
versy:
I attended a VIOS meeting with other managers. This was at the beginning of a school
year, and we already had about 80 incidents. But one of my colleagues [another
school director] simply said: ‘We have no incidents yet and hope to keep it this way.’
(Safety Coordinator I)
From the interviews, and by attending one of the safety coordinator meetings, it
became clear that there is much discussion about how to deﬁne risks. There also is
no uniﬁed approach on how to deal with incidents at schools. The way safety coor-
dinators deﬁne and deal with incidents differs considerably. Differences in safety
practices between schools stem on the one hand from internal factors, such as the
safety policy of school management, as well as the background, preferences, experi-
ence, and other tasks of the safety coordinator. On the other hand, safety practices
are also affected by the interactions and exchange of experiences between schools
and safety coordinators. Although network actors learn from each other they have
the autonomy to make their own decisions and develop their own approach towards
safety.
A signiﬁcant consequence of the differences in risk perceptions and lack of uni-
form standards has to do with the registration of incidents. At the time of our
research (2009) incident registration was problematical and still in a process of
development. Although schools all acknowledged the importance of incident regis-
tration they associated different meanings to this, as the above quotation illustrates.
In particular, the Amsterdam government and police department pointed towards
controversies about registration. We will discuss the issue of incident registration in
a further section.
4.2. Local government and VIOS
Already since 1995, when the national government deﬁned school safety as a prior-
ity issue, the Amsterdam municipality focused on school safety. Since secondary
schools have pupils from various municipal districts, it is important that districts
work together on this issue. School safety policy is centrally organized by the social
development department (DMO) of the local government. However, since
Amsterdam is considered too big to administer centrally, each district also
coordinates school safety policy autonomously. Safety policy as formulated
centrally is thus implemented, and can be adapted, in each district.
922 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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It will be clear that schools cannot be conceived as stand alone organizations.
Not only are schools integrated in a larger network of school boards, the Amster-
dam municipality also interferes in school safety. The Amsterdam municipality
seeks to coordinate policy and advises schools. However, the network in two ways
hinders the cooperation between schools and the local government. This ﬁrstly has
to do with the way schools themselves deal with safety and how they involve
stakeholders. Secondly, local safety policy is characterized by a bottom-up and
demand-driven approach. Schools have to ask for support and advice before the
local government will take action. Informants of the Amsterdam government
stressed both constraints. According to them, school safety is an extremely sensitive
topic for school managers to talk about. Although each school now manages safety,
schools do not feel like discussing and sharing their safety problems with outsiders.
School managers do not even like to share their safety concerns with government
ofﬁcials, inspectors, parents, or police ofﬁcers.
Schools are very reluctant about having a debate on school safety on a higher level.
[…] This is a pity because it hampers decision-making processes. They are pretty
much beating around the bush. That’s the problem. (Local Government Ofﬁcial)
This ofﬁcial believed that the local government should be a ‘guardian of social
safety’ and should therefore have a leading role and bring all participants in the net-
work on one line regarding safety. However, schools are not willing to openly dis-
cuss their safety problems because schools would then run the risk of damaging
their reputation and lose pupils. According to the ofﬁcial quoted above ‘the [mar-
ket] competition among schools simply is very high.’
Schools tend to focus, understandably, on their primary task, which is education,
and frame their safety issues with this task in mind. However, government ofﬁcials
believe that schools should also be concerned about other domains in a pupil’s life,
about what pupils do outside of a school’s territory: ‘What is their family like and
how do they behave in public places?’ (district chairman). Regarding safety, schools
tend to narrowly focus on what happens inside the school gates. School managers
do not regard it as their responsibility what happens on the street or at home. This
is beyond the scope of a school’s safety perspective.
The second hindrance to cooperation between schools and local government
relates to the demand driven approach of the safety policy. Schools have to ask for
advice, subsidies, equipment, or safety trainings. This made the local government
dependent on school initiatives and did not lead to much interaction with schools
regarding safety. The demand driven philosophy was based on the idea that school
safety policy is not something you can easily implement in a top-down way because
for many safety issues there are no straightforward and ﬁxed solutions. Safety prob-
lems are often complex, involving many people and perspectives. Schools are often
incorrectly seen as the site where safety issues arise. As remarked by a local gov-
ernment ofﬁcial: ‘Schools are mirrors of society, not the other way around.’ Insecu-
rity should in this view not be perceived as originating in schools but rather as a
consequence of a divers set of developments in the wider society. In this view other
domains of life are seen as closely related to school safety.
As mentioned in the previous section, VIOS was conceived to work on a
demand driven basis. This is logical because VIOS and the local government were
immediately connected. The local government subsidized VIOS. Although VIOS
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was expected to work on a demand driven basis, this did not work out in practice.
According to a local government informant ‘things do not run smoothly.’ The
demand driven approach led in his view to mostly accidental and arbitrary initia-
tives by schools. He mentioned that for example ‘the most assertive teacher might
consider cyber bullying a problem and subsequently a school manager requests
training on this.’ Despite the fact that schools occasionally contacted VIOS for
advice and training, the local government considered the project a failure. VIOS
and the demand-driven approach were no longer regarded as an effective strategy.
Partly because of this ambiguity and partly because of overall budget cuts in 2010,
the Amsterdam government ended the subsidies for VIOS and with this the entire
VIOS project.
4.3. The police and area ofﬁcials
The Amsterdam police department roughly consists of three segments covering 200
areas, ﬁve districts and one regional level. Since 2000 the Amsterdam police depart-
ment employs over 200 so called ‘area ofﬁcers.’ These ofﬁcers are regarded as the
‘walking eyes’ that get close to the residents and schools in each neighborhood.
The area ofﬁcer is the immediate contact ofﬁcial for schools. This means that the
police know who is working at these schools and that the schools have a direct con-
tact in the police department.
The Amsterdam police is actively involved in school safety policy. A safe
school according to the police is a school in which pupils and teachers are safe and
feel safe. Police activities regarding school safety concern an array of precautionary,
surveillance, protective, and repressive tasks. However, various police informants
observed, similar to the informants from the government, a reluctant attitude by
school managers towards sharing safety problems with other actors in the safety
network. Although the police would like to express goodwill in being a safety part-
ner of schools, and not merely checking on them, school managers do not like their
schools being associated with any police activities. A regional manager of the
Amsterdam police explained this dilemma as follows:
If your school is regularly visited by police ofﬁcers, your school might be considered
unsafe, whereas in reality, the opposite might be true. By regular visits, the police gets
acquainted with your school, and you might know what to do, be even better pre-
pared. (Project manager; Amsterdam police department)
As this police manager indicates, a school which is regularly visited by police ofﬁ-
cers might even be safer than a school where police ofﬁcers hardly drop by and
problems remain hidden or might be cropped up. Signing an alliance between
schools and the police department is used as a means to improve and formalize the
relationship between the police and schools. Formerly, the police had an ofﬁcial
educational task in schools but this task has been ended. As a consequence the
police also lost its immediate contact with schools. A formal alliance makes it eas-
ier for the police to stay informed and to get involved in school safety issues, such
as how to deal with absentees and with regular checks on the lockers of pupils. An
alliance further serves to make agreements and protocols about how to act in case
of more serious incidents.
Although formal alliances and protocols between the police and schools have
not been realized in every Amsterdam police area, most area ofﬁcers do have some
924 J. Binkhorst and S.F. Kingma
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kind of informal agreement and understanding with the schools in their area. The
interviews with four area ofﬁcers indicated that several factors inﬂuence the way
agreements between the police and schools are set up in practice. On the one hand,
the area ofﬁcer’s personality, experience, and attitude as well as the nature of the
district make a difference. The nature of agreements on the other hand also depends
on how schools manage safety and the extent to which schools are willing to share
safety problems with the police. Area ofﬁcers always have to balance their personal
expertise with a school’s safety preferences.
In order to be able to take preventive and protective measures, the police have
to know what kind of incidents occur in a school. At the same time area ofﬁcers
believe that certain incidents, in particular the less serious incidents of course,
should be settled by the schools themselves. An area ofﬁcer explained how he sees
this:
… I don’t have to know everything; a school should be able to solve incidents inter-
nally. The school’s autonomy should at all times be respected and maintained. Even
when schools are transparent, they should be in a position to settle things on their
own; I don’t need to be involved in everything. (Area Ofﬁcer I)
Ofﬁcially, school safety is the school’s responsibility. However, the question is in
which cases school managers should report an incident to the police, for instance
theft. In such cases, the role of the police is often explicitly discussed with the area
ofﬁcer. Whether the police will be involved might, according to a school manager,
‘depend on the kind of pupil we are talking about. Is it just a novice or someone
with a criminal record?’ The balance between the autonomy of a school and police
intervention shifts dependent on the pupil and the nature and severity of the inci-
dent. But when a school covers up safety incidents, the police cannot intervene at
all. Therefore, the police require transparency and openness about safety in order to
be able to balance interests. Alliances, agreements, and covenants serve as the pri-
mary tools for the police to further transparency and to reduce the reluctance on the
part of schools to share information and involve the police.
5. School safety and new risks
The previous section set out the complexity of the network and the network dilem-
mas. In terms of Provan and Kenis (2008), the Amsterdam school safety policy net-
work might be classiﬁed as a ‘participant-governed network.’ The autonomy and
responsibility of the schools is very high and clear leadership of the network is
lacking. At the same time, some stakeholders would like more rules and formal
leadership in order to make the network more effective. The controversies over the
success of the network partly have to do with differences in the risk conceptions of
stakeholders. In this section, we zoom in on the stakeholder’s risk perceptions and
how they actually manage school safety.
5.1. School safety
Traditionally, in the Netherlands safety was perceived as a natural condition of
schools. Schools were typically regarded as ‘safe havens’ as places that people
could trust and where teachers, pupils, and parents could feel like at home. The
image of a school as a safe haven was such that until the 1980s it was hardly
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imaginable that school safety would develop into a social problem. School safety
deﬁnitely had a positive connotation, as something you could rely on and not as
something that was at stake.
However, partly triggered by some severe incidents both abroad and in the
Netherlands, in the course of the 1990s school safety became subject of public
debate. In the Netherlands, these incidents ranged from severe but rare incidents
such as in 2004, in The Hague, the murder of the deputy headmaster by a 16-year-
young criminal pupil at the Terra College, via serious scandals, especially relating
to boarding schools, concerning sexual abuse of pupils by teachers, to common but
relatively minor incidents triggering debates on bullying, ethnic discriminations,
drug trafﬁcking, and sexual intimidations at schools. In sum these incidents and
debates seriously questioned and subverted the positive safety image of schools. Of
course this change was not simply a consequence of incidents. In line with Furedi
(2002) we rather suggest that both the incidents and change in perception are linked
to wider social changes. Irrespective of the causes, the safety image of schools
gradually but deﬁnitely assumed a more negative connotation. In the ﬁrst decade of
the twenty-ﬁrst century, the new and widely shared idea became that politicians,
local ofﬁcials, the police, school managers, and parents should not be naïve. They
better take protective measures and improve the surveillance of schools.
Safety in relation to schools should, in line with Loader and Walker’s (2007)
conception of safety, be regarded as ‘a deeply rooted emotion, not only formulated
negatively, as protection against threats, but at the same time positively, as security,
friendliness, and feeling at “home”’. This understanding of safety takes both the
positive and negative connotations of the concept into account. Various actors in
the school safety network to a greater or lesser extent indeed expressed both safety
dimensions. The balance between the positive and negative side of safety to a sig-
niﬁcant extent even accounted for the differences in risk conceptions and safety
controversies. Differences in organizational interests, objectives, and cultural back-
grounds of the stakeholders make it understandable why uniform and integrated
conceptions of school risks and safety cannot easily be reached across the network.
The network should rather be characterized by differentiated and ambiguous per-
spectives on school risks and safety.
Overall, we ﬁnd that schools have a clear tendency towards the positive under-
standing of safety, as it relates to trust, security, friendliness, and feeling ‘at home,’
whereas the local government and police tend to emphasize the negative connota-
tions relating to external dangers and threats. School informants talked about safety
conditions inside schools rather than the threats they might have to face. They
emphasized the paramount importance of security and a friendly atmosphere in
schools, and the efforts that they make to maintain a safe climate. They did not
stress the uncertainties caused by possible risks from the outside world. Because of
their focus on a positive safety climate camera surveillance, for instance, is not
always considered appropriate. According to this school manager, security depends
in the ﬁrst place on the quality of human interaction in schools:
You know, I see a school as ‘man made’; and you can put as many controls as you
like, such as cameras or detection gates, but the best way to achieve this [safety] is to
involve people. We try to involve pupils and try to do things together. That also is
much more fun. Of course this is labour-intensive, but you’ll probably get an
improved atmosphere because of this people centred approach. (Assistant School
Manager)
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In every day practice, schools focus on this ‘social’ or ‘soft’ side of safety. This
implies that there is overlap between safety, education, and care, also in the roles of
the safety coordinators. The safety coordinators for instance have ‘ﬁrm conversa-
tions’ with the pupils involved in incidents. But when safety is at stake the coordi-
nators prefer to solve incidents in a pedagogical way. They regard this as an
appropriate strategy because excessive violence in schools is still very rare. In the
view of the safety coordinators, the daily safety practices do not require severe pro-
tective measures such as cameras, detection gates, or police intervention.
While the Amsterdam government subscribes to this pedagogical approach, its
overall safety conception differs substantially from the schools’ conception. Policy-
makers from the Amsterdam government take the social and political context of
schools as the starting point for framing safety policy. They mention for instance
social issues such as gay emancipation, ethnic discrimination, and Muslim
radicalization as signiﬁcant circumstances. One of the VIOS informants explicitly
questioned the signiﬁcance of such circumstances for school safety policy:
The government has a tendency to think that these [social] issues are very relevant to
schools but to my opinion this is not the case’. According to him policy makers at the
local government do not have a ‘realistic perception’ on safety because ‘the further a
policy maker is from the actual situation [in schools], fear becomes a more important
factor. (Project Manager VIOS)
In addition, the management of DSP group, a research agency that over the years
conducted several researches about school safety, questioned the effectiveness of
the local government’s school safety policy. They state that the local government
often takes measures without evaluating the effects:
It’s always the same story. Someone in the city council says: ‘It is unsafe in our city;
we need to install more cameras!’ So they install cameras. They easily spent a million
on it. But they don’t know why they are installed, it’s not clear what to do with them,
what the objective is. The whole organization behind it is unclear and no one even
looks at the tapes! (Interview management DSP-group)
In the view of this researcher and school safety consultant technological measures
such as camera surveillance have no proven effect and are expensive. Indeed,
regarding schools research in the UK points towards limited and unintended effects
of CCTV (Taylor 2010). An informant from the Amsterdam local government
acknowledged the limited effects of the safety policy:
As public authority you want to do as much as possible. However, since our present
society entails so many variables, making the right social policy is very complicated.
The local government has to be realistic in what results may be expected. We strive to
the maximal attainable. (Ofﬁcial Local Governement)
The risk and safety conceptions of the Amsterdam police differ from both the
schools and the local government. The main concern for the police, as discussed in
the previous section, is to develop and maintain a good working relationship with
the schools without damaging a school’s reputation. Given the two-sided view on
safety discussed above, it is one of the police’s main tasks to protect people from
dangers and threats. However, this obviously contradicts with the desired safety
image of schools, which would like to express a positive feeling of security. While
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the local government addresses both sides of the safety coin, and the schools pri-
marily focus on the ‘soft’ side, the police is much more focused on the ‘hard’ sur-
veillance and protective side. Therefore, in the safety policy network, the
relationship between the schools and the police is the most controversial one. Police
involvement might be perceived by the schools as a possible threat to their reputa-
tion, i.e. as a ‘reputational risk.’ One of the Amsterdam police ofﬁcials explained
this as follows:
‘Schools state that a frequent contact with the police gives the impression of being
unsafe. This disposition needs to change’ … ‘in order for us to act adequately we
need better cooperation by the schools’ … ‘Schools have to assume that the police is
a professional organisation which knows how to maintain the law.’ (Project Manager,
Amsterdam Police Department)
Because of the sensitivity of this topic, the police is very eager to accommodate to
schools in order to establish a good working relationship.
Despite the different perspectives on school safety policy the stakeholders hardly
address the controversies in emotional terms. They respect and understand each
other’s safety interests and perspectives and seek to develop and inﬂuence safety
management in the direction of what from their point of view would be the most
desirable and effective approach. In doing so the stakeholders primarily focus on
the actual safety issues, rather than on what might possibly happen. In practice this
means that they mainly focus on the high frequency, low consequence risks, rather
than on taking protective measures against rare but severe threats such as shootings.
5.2. Risks and reputation
In this section, we further analyze the nature of the risks associated with school
safety, and how the stakeholders manage and communicate them.
All stakeholders deal on a daily basis with risks associated with school safety.
Dealing with risks always means accepting a certain level of uncertainty, especially
in an open organizational environment such as a school. In fact, deﬁning risks
implies addressing the uncertainties one would like to bring under rational control
(Luhmann 1993; Power 2007). A signiﬁcant aspect of risk management conse-
quently relates to the level of uncertainty that is considered acceptable. But why
would school managers for instance accept the possibility of severe incidents hap-
pening in their schools? How can schools take such a risk without being corrected
by the public or the government? A plausible explanation, according to Power
(2007), relates to the signiﬁcance of ‘secondary’ or reputational risks. A focus on
reputational risk means that organizations are not only concerned with the primary
risks but equally concerned with the public perception of that risk. For that reason,
many kinds of organizations seek to reduce as much uncertainty as possible, for
instance in the case of cars that are called back to the garage or in the case of food
that might be contaminated. However, in the case of schools, this mechanism oper-
ates differently. Schools prefer an open, friendly atmosphere over a closed,
unfriendly surveillance system that might enable them to counter most threats. In
order to understand this different attitude to risks, we have to take a closer look at
risk construction in the context of schools.
Table 1 provides an overview of most of the possible risk objects we came
across during our research. These risk objects are based on the accounts of the
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respondents, policy documents, and media accounts. The table also provides an
indication of the different weight stakeholders attach to these risk objects.
For most stakeholders in the school safety ﬁeld, these risk objects constitute
uncertainties and many of the stakeholders also are aware of them. However, the
stakeholders do not take all risks equally seriously and would not like to include all
of them in safety management policies. All stakeholders consider for instance weap-
ons such as knives and guns as high-risk objects. But bringing a nail ﬁle or even
scissors to school is in some schools prohibited while it has no priority for the
police or for local government. For the latter, religious radicalization or anti-social
behavior has a comparatively higher priority. There is, in short, always a subjective
element involved in deﬁning risk objects. Stereotypes and prejudices may therefore
play a signiﬁcant role in risk perceptions. Moreover, actively chasing risk objects
might result in so called ‘false negatives’ and ‘false positives.’ For instance, how
does one know whether a pupil carries a knife? When a student acts suspiciously
he or she might unjustly be picked whereas someone who behaves correctly does
Table 1. Inventory of the various risk objects regarding school safety.
Risk object School Police Local government
Priority/responsibility (part 1)
Nail ﬁle High Low Low
Scissors High Low Low
Screwdriver High Low Low
Alcohol High Medium Medium
Drugs High Medium Medium
Knife High High High
Guns High High High
Talking in class Medium Low Low
Non-attendance Medium Medium Medium
Using a phone High Low Low
Calling names High Low Low
(Cyber) Bullying High Low Low
MSN Medium Low Low
Pushing Medium Low Low
Fighting High Medium Medium
Angry parents High Medium Medium
Priority/responsibility (part 2)
Lock school doors High Medium Medium
Thievery of a pen Medium Low Low
Thievery of an Ipod High Medium Medium
Small arsons High Medium Medium
Stabbing High High High
School shooting High High High
Sexual intimidation High High High
Threatening High High High
Discrimination High Medium Medium
Loverboys Medium High High
Loitering Medium High High
Home situation Medium Medium High
Wandering at streets Low Medium Medium
Citizenship Low Low High
Radicalization Low High High
Anti-social behavior Low Medium High
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carry a knife and might even use it. Such false negatives and false positives are
inevitable. In this way, chasing suspicious or risky behavior might threaten the posi-
tive safety climate of a school. Due to a strict safety policy, the open atmosphere of
a school will almost certainly disappear. As an unintended consequence, the stress
and strain among students and teachers might increase. In an open atmosphere,
there is more opportunity to address tensions. A teacher referred to this as follows:
Whereas in the past bullying was interpreted as one of the unpleasant aspects of
growing up, today it is seen as a pathology that deeply scars its victim. Fights at
school, testing out the limits of acceptable behaviour is part of puberty and teenagers.
(Teacher, Pvda Website, Amsterdam 2008)
This opinion concurs with Furedi’s (2002) observation mentioned in the theoretical
section that bullying is nowadays regarded as a social problem. However, being
able to express discomfort can also be considered part of normal life. For such rea-
sons, for instance small ﬁghts in schools are often regarded as acceptable or even
as a learning experience for pupils. Many respondents actually referred to this line
of reasoning. In the end, protective measures might ‘suffocate’ social life in schools.
For such reasons, many respondents indicated that a school ‘should not be turned
into a prison.’
The fact that schools are often reluctant towards police involvement, information
sharing, and a public debate on school safety, obviously relates to the idea that this
would make safety risks manifest or ‘visible.’ School managers believe that the
manifestation of risks affects their reputation and directly jeopardizes their trustful
relationship with parents and pupils. Being associated with the police and publish-
ing the nature and number of incidents might have this unintended and unwanted
outcome. Whereas organizations such as airports, casinos, car manufacturers, or
sport stadiums prefer to reduce uncertainties as much as possible, the level of
acceptable uncertainty in schools is signiﬁcantly higher. Taking more protective
measures might improve the actual safety situation in schools, but the chances are
that this would be at the expense of the safety feelings. Since the positive side of
safety is closely associated with the identity and the desired organizational culture,
Dutch schools are overall not (yet) willing to sacriﬁce this precious property for the
sake of safety.
This dilemma is well illustrated with the problematical registration of safety
incidents in schools. Sound registration is advocated from a safety management and
policy point of view. This is much desired by the municipality and also by the
Dutch government which from 2011 onwards even made the registration of safety
incidents in schools obligatory. Schools should register safety incidents as com-
pletely and precisely as possible. This government desire obviously relates to a
basic principle of surveillance which says that in order to control and normalize
one ﬁrst has to gather information and make behavior visible (cf. Foucault 1975).
The Amsterdam research bureau ‘DSP group’ was involved in the design of the
safety incident registration system in schools, the so called IRIS system (DSP-groep
2010). In an interview, a manager of this research institute explained: ‘by exactly
registering what happens, schools are able to reﬂect on the results of the policies
they deploy …’ However, despite the fact that incidents are registered anonymously,
schools are very anxious about sharing sensitive information with others. Tests with
registration systems clearly revealed that registration is often arbitrary or ﬂawed,
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because schools fear unwanted consequences (DSP-groep 2008). Some schools only
register severe incidents (to keep the number of incidents low), while others focus
on more frequent but less severe incidents (to keep the severity of incidents low).
In any case, schools do not openly like to discuss what kinds of incidents occur.
For as long as schools continue to have this ambivalent attitude towards risks, they
remain reluctant to sharing and registering incidents.
Incident registration of the Internet based IRIS system is widely regarded as
problematic and inaccurate. A ﬁrst problem relates to the lack of uniformity in the
deﬁnition of incidents. For registration purposes a long and diverse list of possible
incidents, such as the inventory in Table 1, simply does not work. Therefore, a
national standard has been designed (Mooij and de Wit 2009). This standard
included three main categories: ‘incidents immediately directed at persons’ (vio-
lence, sexual abuse, threats, bullying, and discrimination), ‘incidents not immedi-
ately directed at persons’ (vandalism and theft), and incidents concerning ‘illicit
goods’ (weapons and drugs). Based on this standard, the registration practice has
been tested in 20 schools (DSP-groep 2010). Subsequently, since 2011, the IRIS
registration practice of school safety incidents has been implemented nationwide.
However, the ﬁrst results of this registration practice are clearly ambivalent and
have led to national media reports such as ‘schools conceal violence,’ ‘schools are
a less safe place than they were before,’ and ‘schools do not take action after acts
of violence.’3 Such reports clearly are not favorable for a school’s safety image.
The sensitivity of registration and the differences in registration practice are also
revealed by the difference in outcomes between surveys and the IRIS registration
system, for instance regarding the most prevalent safety incidents (Table 2) (DSP-
groep 2009).
Table 2 indicates that compared to the IRIS system, the survey gives a higher
victim percentage regarding bullying, discrimination, and weapons. The most likely
explanation for this is that these categories refer to secret activities and therefore
are not easily noticed and registered. On the other hand, there are also activities that
tend to be reported more frequently in the registration system, such as theft, threats,
Table 2. Risks revealed by surveys and IRIS Registrations.
Most prevalent incidents
according to survey and to IRIS
Top 10 position
Survey IRIS
Bullying 1 5
Fighting 2 2
Vandalism 3 3
Discrimination 4 10
Sexual intimidation 5 7
Weapons 6 -
Theft 7 1
Fire setting 8 9
Drugs 9 8
Threats 10 4
Maltreatment - 6
Source: DSP-groep (2009, 6).
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and maltreatment. Interestingly, the differences between surveys and the IRIS
registration system seem to decrease for schools that report many incidents. Appar-
ently schools that report a lot of incidents narrow the gap between the registrations
and the ‘real’ level of incidents (DSP-groep 2009, 7).
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have outlined the emergence of a policy network regarding school
safety in the Amsterdam region. We analyzed in particular three hubs of this net-
work, the schools, the local government, and the police department. In our view,
such a policy network mediates between the general conditions of the risk society
(Beck 1992) and a culture of fear (Furedi 2002) on the one hand and the institution
of safety standards at the organizational level of schools on the other hand. This is
because school risks are related to a heightened risk sensitivity, to the redeﬁnition
of more and more uncertainties into risks and the (unrealistic) ultimate goal of exor-
cizing all dangers and creating a perfect safety situation. Indeed, as we have seen,
school safety addresses relatively new risks and has emerged as a relatively new
organizational property and policy issue in the Netherlands. Although our research
is only explorative and this article does not make claims which go beyond the
Dutch situation, the tentative conclusion is rather clear. In the Netherlands school
safety policy has been mainly initiated, reinforced, and legitimated by some serious
incidents and by the political and policy ﬁeld outside of school organizations. It has
only reluctantly been implemented by Dutch schools. At the same time, this policy
intervention reveals a controversy between the risk and safety conceptions of
schools and of safety policies. In this concluding paragraph, we would like to stress
three signiﬁcant aspects of this risk and safety controversy.
First, school safety is not at all a self-evident policy or management aspect of
schools. On the contrary, as we have seen, schools tend to regard safety as a natural
and integral condition of school culture which can even do without safety manage-
ment. In this respect, they stress the soft side of safety as a friendly atmosphere and
a positive safety feeling based on mutual trust. A focus on the soft side of safety
may also explain the reluctance of schools towards the hard sides of safety as
implied in protective measures, local safety policies, and police interference. The
security view also favors a pedagogical (rather than a corrective) approach in deal-
ing with rule breakers and incidents. Within schools, a certain range of asocial
behavior is further considered ‘normal’ as long as it can be countered by the social
control mechanisms in schools. This view does not count for severe incidents con-
cerning extreme school violence of course. However, such incidents tend to be con-
sidered as exceptional and impossible to prevent anyway. In such a security
context, the line between uncertainties and unacceptable risks is made dependent
upon the circumstances and subjective interpretations. Schools are in this view also
seen as a reﬂection of society, as an environment where you cannot completely rule
out the dangers from the wider society.
Second, with the development of the local school safety policy in the ﬁrst dec-
ade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Amsterdam schools developed a greater risk aware-
ness and introduced speciﬁc safety measures. However, this did not imply the
replacement of the school’s soft security focus with a tough safety shield but rather
the beginning of a transitional phase in which the schools negotiate safety standards
with the local government and the police. This triggered the emergence of a school
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safety policy network which involved an increasing number of safety actors. In this
network the schools, the local government, the VIOS, and the police were the key
safety stakeholders. These stakeholders related, as we have seen, their understanding
of school safety to their speciﬁc organizational practice, i.e. their position, tasks,
and interests within the network. In particular, the police tended to frame school
risks and safety in terms of external threats and surveillance measures. The munici-
pality tended towards a middle position in between the security view of schools
and the safety view of the police. From the viewpoint of ANT, the emergence of a
new safety policy went together with the translation of safety into the terms of the
various organizational actors involved (Callon 1986; Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella
1998; Latour 2005). By focusing on the risk and safety perceptions of schools, the
government and the police, a light could be shed on how precisely safety policy
can be conceived as a product and achievement of the entire network, and how the
meaning of safety relates to organizational interests. It became clear that the net-
work did not result in a uniform and unambiguous safety policy and in smooth
cooperation between the various stakeholders. The network rather made controver-
sies in risk perceptions and safety measures manifest.
In particular, Provan and Kenis’s (2008) framework for network governance
proved helpful in explaining the limited effectiveness of the school safety network.
On ﬁrst sight, the school safety network ﬁts the ‘participant-governed network’
since it basically relies on the risk perceptions and interpretations of the various
stakeholders, such as the safety coordinators at schools and the area ofﬁcers of the
police. However, as indicated by Provan and Kenis (2008), this model of network
governance is most effective under conditions of trust among stakeholders, a rela-
tively small size of the network, a consensus on goals, and low external expecta-
tions. Precisely these conditions are not met in the researched Amsterdam policy
network: there is distrust among stakeholders, relating to the reluctance of schools
towards cooperation with the government, and the police; with over 70 schools, the
network’s size is rather big; and there is a lack of consensus and to some extent
even opposing views regarding both the causes of the school safety problem and
the best safety solutions. As we have seen most stakeholders acknowledge these
weaknesses and efforts were made to improve the effectiveness of the network, in
particular by the local government and the police. These initiatives point towards
the need of a network modiﬁcation in the direction of what Provan and Kenis
(2008) call a ‘lead-organization network,’ in which the local government would
have to take a ﬁrm coordinating role, or an independent NAO such as the VIOS.
Since the local government itself was not willing to take a leading role and the
VIOS was abolished in 2010, greater effectiveness of the school safety network, by
stronger leadership in order to overcome network controversies, seems for the
moment unlikely. In this respect, our study draws a conclusion similar to Webster’s
conclusion regarding the diffusion of CCTV in the UK, namely that (local) govern-
ment ‘remains the dominant actor in the policy process through its ability to shape
and inﬂuence networks’ (Webster 2004, 230).
Third, the emerging policy network regarding school safety in the Amsterdam
region implied the development and institution of new norms regarding school
safety. These norms particularly address the differences and negotiations between
the risk and safety opinions of schools on the one hand, and the local government
and the police on the other. While the contradictions in interests and opinions have
become manifest, these contradictions are at the same time respected and taken into
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account by the various stakeholders, for instance in covenants and agreements
between schools and police. In this respect, we have identiﬁed the possible threat to
the reputation of schools as the major problem schools fear because of intrusive sur-
veillance measures, incident registration, public safety reports, and police interven-
tion. In a way the stakeholders have to recognize and deal with a ‘secondary risk,’
i.e. the ‘reputational risk’ (Power et al. 2009), schools face as a consequence of pro-
tective measures. The agreements in particular seek to overcome the reluctance by
schools towards hard safety measures, which might even be counterproductive and
undermine the security of schools, and the concern by the local government and the
police over external threats on school safety from the wider society. The newly
emerging safety culture therefore constitutes a hybrid safety culture in which a new
temporary balance seems to be found between the ‘soft’ security side and the ‘hard’
surveillance side of safety. The new safety culture reﬂects a paradox between an
increasing awareness of school risk and school reputation.
Notes
1. PvdA Amsterdam Website: http://www.amsterdam.pvda.nl/nieuwsbericht/5270, visited:
23 May 2008.
2. RTV-NH, ‘Court of appeal conﬁrms 11 months sentence for TEC stabber,’ 22 July
2008.
3. de Telegraaf 16 December 2010; Scholen-weten-niet-om-te-gaan-met-hun-publicitaire-
rampen.dhtml (VK. 5 April 2011); EénVandaag, 28 April 2011.
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